Naraphorn Haphuriwat
(Ph.D. Student at the University of Wisconsin-Madison)

Educations

• Ph.D. 2007-present, Operations Research, Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Wisconsin-Madison
• Master 2007, Operations Research, Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Wisconsin-Madison
• Bachelor 2005, Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Wisconsin-Madison

• Container security against terrorism
• Resource allocation for homeland security
• Security on critical infrastructure
• Border security

• Vicki M. B., N. Haphuriwat, J. Menoyo, R. Zimmerman, and A. Culpen, "Optimal resource allocation for defense of targets based on differing measures of attractiveness," Risk Analysis 28(3), pp.763-770, June 2008. Read abstract
• Vicki M. B., E. R. Gratz, N. J. Haphuriwat, W. Magua, and K. R. Wierzbicki, "Methodology for identifying near-optimal interdiction strategies for a power transmission system," Reliability Engineering & System Safety 92(9), pp. 1155-1161, September 2007. Read abstract

Presentations

• Haphuriwat, N., V.M. Bier. "How many containers to inspect to deter terrorist attacks" (poster and presentation on student day), Annual Department of Homeland Security University Network Summit, Washington, DC, March 18-20, 2008.
• Haphuriwat, N., V.M. Bier, J. Menoyo, R. Zimmerman, and A. Culpen, "Optimal resource allocation for defense of multiple targets," INFORMS Midwest Regional Conference, Northwestern University, August 24-25, 2007.
• Haphuriwat, N., Vicki M. B., E. R. Gratz, W. Magua, and K. R. Wierzbicki, "Methodology for identifying near-optimal interdiction strategies for a power transmission system," The Society for Risk Analysis 2006 Annual Meeting, Baltimore, Maryland, December 3-6, 2006.

• Game Theory
• Bayesian Analysis
• Stochastic Modeling Techniques
• Dynamic Programming
• Linear Programming Methods
• Integer Programming
• Nonlinear Programming

• Honorable mention in the 2004-2005 University Book Store Academic Excellence Award Competition for a research project that aims to identify the optimal number of peripheral computers (if any) that the attacker should compromise, and to characterize how that number changes with respect to changes in parameters such as the cost of a successful attack on the peripheral computers, the value of a successful attack on each peripheral computer, and the value of a successful attack on the core computer.